On the Juridical Relevance of the Phenomenological Notion of Person in Max Scheler and Edith Stein by Galofaro, Francesco
Vol.:(0123456789)
Int J Semiot Law
https://doi.org/10.1007/s11196-021-09823-z
1 
On the Juridical Relevance of the Phenomenological Notion 
of Person in Max Scheler and Edith Stein
Francesco Galofaro1 
Accepted: 18 January 2021 
© The Author(s) 2021
Abstract
The paper presents a semiotic interpretation of the phenomenological debate on 
the notion of person, focusing in particular on Edmund Husserl, Max Scheler, and 
Edith Stein. The semiotic interpretation lets us identify the categories that orient 
the debate: collective/individual and subject/object. As we will see, the phenomeno-
logical analysis of the relation between person and social units such as the commu-
nity, the association, and the mass shows similarities to contemporary socio-semi-
otic models. The difference between community, association, and mass provides an 
explanation for the establishment of legal systems. The notion of person we inherit 
from phenomenology can also be useful in facing juridical problems raised by the 
use of non-human decision-makers such as machine learning algorithms and artifi-
cial intelligence applications.
Keywords Socio-semiotics · Values · Community · Mass · Human rights · 
Exclusion · Responsibility · Voluntary termination of pregnancy · Artificial 
intelligence · Electronic personality
1 Introduction
The phenomenological definition of “person” was proposed by Max Scheler [1] 
in the framework of a scientific study of ethics aimed at going beyond the limit of 
Kant’s formalistic point of view on morals, thanks to the phenomenological methods 
proposed by Edmund Husserl [2]. This issue is still much debated in philosophy of 
law: formalistic points of view, such as legal positivism, seem too weak, since they 
justify every internally coherent legal system, including the Nuremberg Laws. On 
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the other hand, material approaches do not explain cultural variations. Alan Der-
showitz provided a good review of different unsatisfactory philosophical approaches 
[3]. Unfortunately, his solution, according to which legal systems empirically 
emerge from our collective experience of injustice, only postpones the problem: is 
there such a thing as “collective experience”? As we will see, on the basis of Max 
Scheler’s personalism, Edith Stein was to advance a phenomenological analysis of 
this subject, which is relevant from a semiotic point of view because it involves tech-
nical notions, such as collective actor and modal value, which allow us to glimpse a 
strong connection between formation of law and meaning. In fact, what will emerge 
is that Scheler’s analysis of ethics expresses a relation between values embodied by 
objects targeted by acts of which the subject is the person. In particular, the person 
is given only where it possesses a power to do by means of the body [1]. It is almost 
inevitable to interpret this definition in semiotic terms: in particular, we consider 
Scheler’s notion of person as an anthropomorphic actor who embodies the actan-
tial function of a qualified subject [4]. It will become apparent that the person in 
Scheler’s definition cannot be identified with other kinds of actor individuated by 
Greimas’ typology.
1.1  What a Person is Not: Reason and Memory
According to Scheler, the notion of person cannot be reduced to “rationality” [1: 
371]. The rules of rational, logical reasoning leading to universal conclusions must 
be shared by all rational humans. In a similar way, different Greek philosophers 
argue that there is only one general intellect, the νοῦς.1 We find a similar conclusion 
in Scholastic philosophy, according to which intellect is a general form2: the unity 
of reason would lead to the conclusion that there is only one collective person. On 
the contrary, phenomenology aims to break down the line of demarcation between 
objectivist ontology and idealist subjectivity [7]. Along these lines, according to 
Scheler, the person is a concrete essential unit: the foundation of the multiplicity 
of acts realised by each of us. However, the person is not identified with the mere 
1 A compendium of classical philosophy is outside the scope of this paper. We recall Plotinus’s Enneads, 
fifth book, which merges Aristotelian and Platonic tradition and which deeply influenced later Christian 
philosophy by presenting the doctrine of the hypostases [5].
2 See for example Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologiae, first part, question 76, Article 1: “the intellect 
which is the principle of intellectual operation is the form of the human body. For that whereby primar-
ily anything acts is a form of the thing to which the act is to be attributed: for instance, that whereby a 
body is primarily healed is health, and that whereby the soul knows primarily is knowledge; hence health 
is a form of the body, and knowledge is a form of the soul. The reason is because nothing acts except so 
far as it is in act; wherefore a thing acts by that whereby it is in act. Now it is clear that the first thing by 
which the body lives is the soul. And as life appears through various operations in different degrees of 
living things, that whereby we primarily perform each of all these vital actions is the soul. For the soul 
is the primary principle of our nourishment, sensation, and local movement; and likewise of our under-
standing. Therefore this principle by which we primarily understand, whether it be called the intellect or 
the intellectual soul, is the form of the body. This is the demonstration used by Aristotle (De Anima ii, 
2)” [6].
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summation of her/his acts nor with the experience of those acts, because her/his way 
of being is to live each act: we cannot find the person in the already lived acts—
[8: 856]. This is part of a more general distancing from Empiricist tradition and its 
heirs,3 such as Ernst Mach and Henri Bergson. As Scheler writes:
Apart from other errors which one can find in these theories, the specific for-
mations of unities of things in the natural view of the world are obviously con-
founded with the essence of the form of unities: thingness. Of course, one can 
avail oneself of values in explicating the formation of units of things, but not 
in explicating thingness [1: 21].
We can, for example, possess with full evidence the beauty of a poem or a 
painting without being able to say to which factors this value is attached, e.g., 
color, design, composition, rhythm, musical characteristics, speech-values, 
picture-values, etc. [1: 196].
As a consequence, the person is not memory:
(…) we can possess with full evidence the values of the object without its 
being given to us with the same degree of evidence or with the same degree of 
fullness in its “meaning,” and that we can do this independent of the sphere of 
remembering [ibid.].
This seems interesting from a juridical point of view, otherwise every technical 
device with a storage memory would be defined a “person”. We will return to this 
point in the conclusion.
1.2  Empirical Person Vs. Transcendental Ego
Scheler then goes on to demonstrate that the person is not the “Ego”. Interestingly, 
Scheler reaches this conclusion after a linguistic analysis of terms such as “ego”, 
whose meaning is opposed to a “thou” and to the “other world” [1: 389]. On the 
contrary, for Scheler, a person need not be opposed to another. In a Kantian per-
spective, the Ego of transcendental apperception is not a correlate that is added to 
the unity of the object; its unity and identity constitute the condition of the unity 
and identity of the object. Instead, according to Scheler, a person includes the 
world, as an objective correlate of experience. This is an application of a funda-
mental assumption of the realist phenomenology embraced by Scheler: every expe-
rience has an objective correlate. For example, if a number of people declare they 
have shared a telepathic experience, this implies that telepathy has an objective 
correlate, which can be scientifically analysed by phenomenology, as the phenom-
enologist Gerda Walther did [9].
Therefore, each individual person carries her/his own individual world and per-
sonal truth, not because of relativism (Scheler’s research program in ethics is to 
oppose relativism) but on account of the essential connection between person and 
3 I am in debt to Gabriele Vissio, who called my attention to this point.
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world. On this point Husserl and Scheler agree: “The ego is the constituting source 
and the person as the fully concrete agent in a social world (…) The person is the 
focus of moral regard and the bearer of rights” [10]. Even after the “transcendental 
turn” in his researches, Husserl considered valid the distinction between transcen-
dental ego and person:
Above all, however, it is versus the empirical subject, in its generality and its 
unity, that the “person” is to be delimited in the specific sense: the subject of 
acts which are to be judged from the standpoint of reason, the subject that is 
“self-responsible,” the subject that is free or in bondage, unfree. [11: 269].
The person is the subject equipped with the consciousness of the free “I can”, and 
not with the mere consciousness that “it will come”, “it will happen”.
However, while Scheler and Husserl seem to agree on the notion of person, they 
disagree on the very possibility of a transcendental Ego. In Scheler, the notion of 
person clearly substitutes the notion of transcendental Ego. According to Scheler, 
identity is in the object: objects provide the sufficient, intuitive basis for the law of 
identity (A = A), and there is not a “condition” to it borrowed from an “Ego”. While 
in a transcendental perspective the relation between Ego and Object given in the act 
is unilateral, phenomenological realism describes it as a mutual one. From this point 
of view, Ego can be represented as an object linked to a second object by the act, 
while the act in itself cannot be represented as an object [1: 374]. Scheler describes 
this mutual relation as a “Copernican turn”: world-being is a “condition” of the cog-
itare [1: 376].
1.3  Person as a Linguistic Construction
According to several legal systems, some categories of people can be killed without 
this act constituting a murder: slaves, embryos, sons and daughters, wives, enemies 
in war. In these cases, “there was no givenness (or legal recognition) of the personal-
ity of the killed” [1: 315]. These categories were not considered persons, but “ani-
mated bodies (in feeling)” [ibid.]: their personality was not given in terms of human 
individuals, but in terms of units like a master, or a family, tribe, gens, state.
An interesting example, from a semiotic point of view, is Italian law No. 194 
of 22 May 1978 on the social protection of motherhood and the voluntary ter-
mination of pregnancy [12]. The “non-personality” of the unborn is a meaning 
resulting from a careful textual strategy which avoids referring to “it” or nam-
ing “it”. The Law designs the relations between some actors: counselling cen-
tres (10 occurrences); physicians (20 occurrences); women (61 occurrences). 
The term “abortion” is used only in a dysphoric acceptation (“to prevent abor-
tion from being used for purposes of birth control”; “crime of abortion”) and is 
substituted by “termination of pregnancy” (35 occurrences), which—in the terms 
used by structural semantics—underlines a terminative aspectual value. The term 
“abortion procedures” is used to translate the Italian expression “procedure abor-
tive” in the context of Art. 14, since women are obliged to be informed about 
them. We also find the “father of the conceptus” (4 occurrences), who cannot of 
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course legally be regarded as a fully-fledged father and is involved only “where 
the woman consents” (art. 5). Thus, the “father of the conceptus” cannot be con-
sidered an actant in the main narrative program and merely plays a role in what 
Greimas calls an annex narrative program [4]. The term “fetus” is used only in 
two contexts: first, in relation to “abnormalities or malformations”, in a dysphoric 
acceptation (2 occurrences). In these cases, the English term “fetus” translates the 
Italian term “nascituro”, which is used quite paradoxically, seeing that it means 
“someone who is about to be born.” Second (2 occurrences, Art. 7), “Where it is 
possible that the fetus may be viable”, i.e. in relation to life. In this case, the law 
obliges the doctor to take any appropriate action to save the life of the “fetus”. In 
all other contexts the use of this term is not necessary. For example:
The physician performing the pregnancy termination shall be required to 
supply the woman with information and instructions on birth control and to 
acquaint her with the abortion procedures [12, Art. 14].
The sentence above is well-formed from a syntactic point of view. Other act-
ants of the abortion procedures do not need to be specified. According to Luc 
Boltanski [13] doctors at the ultrasound test draw a similar linguistic distinction 
between the fetus “adopted” by the parents and the accidental one, which will not 
be the object of a life project.
According to Scheler, the non-personal “animated bodies” do not embody a 
“complex of values” that are associated to murder. As the example of the Ital-
ian law shows, the attribution of a personal or non-personal value to an entity is 
mainly a linguistic construction. Furthermore, some of the “depersonalised” enti-
ties, such as slaves or war enemies, obviously have a conscience. For this reason, 
conscience cannot be identified with the notion of personality. The person is not 
reducible to consciousness, or the object of inner perception, since loving, hating, 
feeling, willing, have their meaning in the union of the person with a body [1: 
392]. For Scheler, the person is invariant regardless of “changes in our psychic 
life”:
What psychiatry says about so-called changes in character in certain psy-
chic illnesses can never pertain to the person of the other, even in the most 
severe cases (e.g., paralysis). It is only the givenness-to-others of his person 
that disappears. In severe cases we can only say that /his person was made 
invisible by the illness and that a judgment about his person is therefore no 
longer possible [1: 485].
It is worth noting that this position challenges consciousness-based bioethical 
distinctions between person and non-person, according to which the latter, e.g. 
the embryo or the patient in a vegetative state, can be killed. At the same time, 
Scheler displays extraordinary sensitivity toward mental illness, ahead of his 
time. On a similar line, it is known how Husserl considered as persons, at least in 
a broad acceptation, “abnormal variants of humanness”, such as brutes and some 
kinds of animals [14: 126]. Nowadays, Husserl’s choice of world sounds poor, but 
his stance was surely a progressive one when considering the National-Socialist 
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theories of the time. On the subject of animal rights, Scheler grants intelligence, 
associative memory, and an “essential connection between a consciousness and 
a lived body” to higher animals [1: 472, n. 104]. Animals feel values (e.g. agree-
able/disagreeable; useful/harmful) [1: 266]. However, according to him, “moral 
facts” cannot be found in nature [1: 164] and we do not expect obedience to moral 
law on the part of animals [1: 237].
1.4  The Narrative Features of Scheler’s Person
To draw some semiotic conclusions from the above paragraphs, we can identify 
Scheler’s person as an anthropomorphic actor who embodies the actantial func-
tion of a qualified subject. According to Scheler, the person is not reducible to an 
abstract actor, a human faculty such as “reason”, or “memory”. Thus, the person 
must be described as a concrete actor. As regards the actantial role, the person must 
be, at least potentially, capable of action: thus, it is not sufficient to be an object in 
someone else’s action program to be considered a person: the actor must embody 
the function of a qualified subject, i.e. a subject in conjunction with the modal value 
of knowledge and power.
1.5  Are There Collective Persons?
There is one last problem related to the description of phenomenological persons as 
actors: are there collective persons? Law grants the legal person (in Latin: persona 
ficta) certain rights, duties, and a degree of responsibility, similar to individual per-
sons. Thus, the relation between individual persons and collective actors, such as 
companies and government agencies, needs to be clarified. According to Scheler, 
it is possible to define “collective persons” as the various centres of experience 
in an endless totality of living with one another [1: 520]. According to this view, 
every person experiences being a member of a community of persons, a social unit, 
described as a sphere of co-responsibility. Husserl agrees on the presence, in the 
world, of “personalities of a higher order” (state, church) [14: 77].
However, according to Edith Stein, when identifying communities of life as a col-
lective person, Scheler encounters a difficulty in relating individual responsibility 
and freedom to the collective responsibility of the community [15: 276]. Stein notes 
that in an empirical community, not every member is a free and fully responsible 
person, and speculates about a collective person whose members are not responsible 
persons:
If the community no longer contains any free persons, or none who build up 
the community with their personal living, then it is certainly no longer capable 
of any goal-setting. Then the question is, what is left to the community at all. 
Not a shred of responsibility, it seems to me, first of all. You can no longer 
talk of responsibility in any sense in a community in which no single person is 
responsible. There is no free acting here, no more free self-formation, but only 
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an impulsive doing that no longer can be considered as bearer of any responsi-
bility [15: 276].
To solve this difficulty, we will now resume Edith Stein’s analysis of the nexus 
between individual persons and their consequences in terms of philosophy of law.
2  Person and Community in Edith Stein
Edith Stein was Husserl’s scholar (1913) and private assistant (1916–1918). She 
also attended the lectures Max Scheler gave to the Göttingen Philosophical Society 
in 1913 [10]. She dedicated her doctoral dissertation to empathy, a kernel problem 
in phenomenology [16]. Both Husserl and Max Scheler [17] investigated forms of 
sympathy, empathy, and love to explain how we grant the status of subject to other 
people, avoiding the risk of solipsism related to the analysis of the intentional rela-
tion between one’s consciousness and the world. Later on, Edith Stein proposed an 
interesting phenomenological analysis of grief, aimed at studying the relationship 
between individual and community [15]. In particular, she considered the following 
example: the army unit in which I am serving is grieving over the loss of its leader.
Thus everyone has grief that is individually his or hers: even though it is legit-
imate to say, on the other hand, that they all feel “the same” grief. This “self-
sameness” has significance that merits precise exposition. The grief is quite a 
private content that I feel, but it is not only that. It has a sense, and by virtue of 
that sense it claims to count for something lying beyond the private experienc-
ing, something subsisting objectively, through which it is rationally substanti-
ated. In our sense the objective item to which the grief applies according to its 
sense is the loss of the leader. Thus the correlate of experience is the same for 
everyone who participates in it. [15, 135].
Again, we find the ground assumption of realist phenomenology, according to which 
each experience corresponds to an objective correlate. Referentialist semiotic the-
ories of the period play a role in the identification of the correlate of experience: 
individual grief has a meaning if and only if this meaning is related to an ontologi-
cal counterpart, a state-of-affairs or a situation, by a judgement. Husserl discusses 
judgements in [6, 5th and 6th research], merging Brentano’s and Bolzano’s views. 
To summarise his position, judgement is built up on perception, imagination, mem-
ory, etc. articulating and specifying a state-of-affairs which is linked by the rays 
of a sort of geometrical projection. It implies an act of will, a stance, and—when 
sedimented—it can become a belief and a conviction. Thus, judgement can be life-
changing: if, on the one hand, we are conscious of our own life as endlessly flowing 
[18: 145], on the other it is a continual striving for a judicative decision and the 
establishment of passed judgements [18: 100], a striving after intuition that realises 
the intended self [18: 146].
 F. Galofaro 
1 3
2.1  Rights from Empathy
Edith Stein’s analysis of grief, presented above, proves that, as an entity, the person pre-
supposes a relationship with other people: being a person does not mean being unique 
and unrepeatable but being in mutual empathic recognition. In structural terms, we can 
resume the analysis of the lexemes “person” and “community” as follows:
Person = /individual/ + /subject/
Community = /collective/ + /subject/
In the formulae??, /individual/, /collective/, /subject/, and /object/ are values in the 
acceptation of structural semantics [19]. In this perspective, the Other is recognised as 
person by the community:
Other = /individual/ + /subject/
The intersubjective relationships established by empathy enable us to recognize the 
Other as a person, therefore as a bearer of rights and duties; the intersubjective circular-
ity of this recognition is the basis for universal and unconditional reciprocity, through 
the establishment of the legal system.
2.2  Inferior Human Beings with No Rights
There is an important difference between Husserl’s transcendental point of view and 
Stein’s empirical one: according to Husserl, if empathy characterizes the transcenden-
tal Ego, i.e. if it is the condition of possibility of the Ego, we are always in a situa-
tion of harmony in the community of Egos. This would lead to the foundation of one 
and only one State, and one and only one legal system, based on human rights. On the 
other hand, Stein’s empirical analysis does not admit the method of the “epochè”, i.e. 
the absence of commitment about the existence of the world aimed at experiencing the 
transcendental features of the Ego. If empathy is a transcendental feature, then every 
human being should always be in a relation of empathy with other humans: it is the 
notion of transcendental intersubjectivity. On the contrary, empirical experience shows 
many situations in which the relation between society and the Other is merely instru-
mental and the latter is just an object:
Other = /individual/ + /object/
As an example, let us think of the inferior status accorded by many legal systems to 
different categories of persons, like immigrants and their children in current Italian law, 
or Jews in Nazi Germany. A case in point is Pierre L. van den Berghe’s notion of her-
renvolk democracy:
A dual political system in which the ruling ethnic group maintains a representa-
tive government with a façade of formal democracy for itself and rules the rest of 
the population as colonial subjects [20: 165].
The author extended this notion from South Africa to the United States and Israel, but 
current Italian law on immigration can be considered a special instance, as it does not 
grant certain rights to particular categories of immigrants, for example, differentiating 
healthcare assistance.
1 3
On the Juridical Relevance of the Phenomenological Notion…
2.3  Community, Association, Mass
In a controversy with Martin Heidegger, Husserl interpreted instrumentality in 
human relations as part of a crisis in European culture [21]; on the contrary, Edith 
Stein considers the social unit based on instrumental relations as a mere empirical 
possibility. She defines as “association” the social unity in which the individuals 
gathered together regard one another reciprocally as objects. However, while associ-
ations are nevertheless collective subjects, Edith Stein acutely observed a new politi-
cal phenomenon of her times: the rise of the masses and their manipulation by char-
ismatic leaders. Stein agrees with Scheler [1] on the fact that a mass is constituted by 
passive contagion and involuntary imitation. Unlike communities and associations,
The individuals who are gathered together into the mass are generally not ori-
ented toward one another (…). Their sentient life occurs only isomorphically 
with that of the others, who are joined with them into a unity by being gath-
ered spatially, and, to be sure, as a result of being gathered together. (…). [15: 
241].
Her views on the passivity of masses are influenced by Simmel [22]. According 
to Edith Stein, the consistency in the behaviour of the mass (…) lends it its character 
of “collective objectivity” [15: 243]. Thus, we can say:
Mass = /collective/ + /object/
3  Discussion
To resume our research, on the basis of the semiotic interpretation of the phenom-
enological notion of person in Max Scheler and Edith Stein presented above, we can 
define the person as an individual, anthropomorphic actor who embodies the actan-
tial function of a qualified subject. However, the notion of person is also a relational 
feature: in order to be a person, any individual must empathically recognize other 
persons and be recognized by them. This happens in a particular social unit, the 
community. The intersubjective circularity of this recognition of rights and duties is 
the basis for the establishment of the legal system. Nonetheless, while empathy tends 
to establish universal legal systems based on human rights, other kinds of relations 
between individuals are possible: instrumental, programmed relationships, and con-
tagion. Different societies and laws are formed by combining the semiotic categories 
Table 1  Social unities according to Edith Stein
Community Association Mass
Is a collective … Subject Subject Object
Orienting function Empathy Instrumental relationships Contagion
Relation between individuals Subject–Subject 
(person)
Subject–Object Absence of relation
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Collective/Individual and Subject/Object. They also underlie the inclusion and the 
exclusion of human groups, giving rise to hierarchies of humans. Table 1 resumes 
the relation between the notion of person as an individual actor with the role of 
qualified subject and the collective actors with which she/he is always relationally 
entangled.
3.1  Case History: Artificial Intelligence
It is possible to attribute personal or non-personal semantic values to an algorithm 
or to a set of algorithms. This is made possible by a semiotic strategy similar to the 
one we saw in paragraph 1.3. For example, let us compare two definitions, retrieved 
from websites:
In statistics, linear regression is a linear approach to modelling the relationship 
between a scalar response and one or more explanatory variables (also known 
as dependent and independent variables) [23].
Machine learning is the ability for a computer to output or do something that 
it was not programmed to do. While machine learning emphasizes making 
predictions about the future, artificial intelligence typically concentrates on 
programming computers to make decisions. If you use an intelligent program 
that involves human-like behaviour, it can be artificial intelligence. However, 
if the parameters are not automatically learned (or derived) from data, it is not 
machine learning. [24].
The two definitions are broadly equivalent: the linear regression algorithm is widely 
used in supervised machine learning [25: 277]. However, nobody would ascribe a 
legal personality to a statistic approach linking some variables to an approximat-
ing function. On the contrary, the second definition attributes human features to the 
algorithm: it is not programmed; it learns from data; it is intelligent; it predicts the 
future; it behaves like a human. The humanity of the algorithm is semiotically con-
structed through texts and images representing brains, heads, sparkling neurons.
Let us analyse a juridical text, the European Parliament resolution of 16 February 
2017 with recommendations to the Commission on Civil Law Rules on Robotics 
(2015/2103(INL) [26] and its summary [27]. The document asks the Commission to 
explore the implications of different topics. Among the others:
creating a specific legal status for robots in the long run, so that at least the 
most sophisticated autonomous robots could be established as having the sta-
tus of electronic persons responsible for making good any damage they may 
cause [27].
In the summary, robots are defined as “smart” (3 occurrences). According to the 
document, the features that define a smart robot are:
– the acquisition of autonomy through sensors and/or by exchanging data with its 
environment (inter-connectivity) and the trading and analysing of those data;
– self-learning from experience and by interaction (optional criterion);
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– at least a minor physical support;
– the adaptation of its behaviour and actions to the environment;
– absence of life in the biological sense [26: 1]
According to the Parliament, “special attention should be paid to the possible devel-
opment of an emotional connection between humans and robots ‒ particularly in 
vulnerable groups (children, the elderly and people with disabilities).”
After the adoption of the text, a number of Artificial Intelligence and Robotics 
experts, industry leaders, and experts in law, medicine and ethics wrote an open let-
ter to the European Commission [28]. According to this letter, the Parliament’s reso-
lution is “distorted by Science-Fiction and a few recent sensational press announce-
ments”. Nevertheless, the possibility of creating a status of “electronic person” on 
the model of the status of “legal person” is still the object of studies commissioned 
by the European Parliament [29].
If we adopt Scheler’s point of view, personhood cannot be identified with any of 
the features of the new robots (smartness, learning skills, adaptation to the environ-
ment), since personhood is the basis that assures their unity. However, this essential-
ist point of view gives us no indication on how to prove the existence of an objective 
correlate of a supposed electronic personhood. Is there a ghost in the shell?
Adopting Edith Stein’s perspective can be interesting, since the document indi-
cates a possible intersubjective relation between the robot and human beings (“emo-
tional connections”). Thus, some humans could consider robots as “persons” when 
interacting, working, or playing with them: as individual subjects belonging to the 
collective subject “community” on the basis of mutual empathic recognition. A sim-
ilar argument could be advanced to extend personhood to specific animals, in order 
to grant them some rights.
On the other hand, the Parliament proposes a second intersubjective reason to 
extend the notion of personhood to robots: the reparation of the damage they can 
cause. In this case, the relation between humans (subject) and robots (object) is 
merely instrumental.
3.2  Further Developments
The notion of person we receive from the phenomenological debate seems useful 
in evaluating interesting new legal problems, such as the responsibility of machine 
learning algorithms and artificial intelligence. A computer has a memory and can 
keep track of every performed “act”. I have placed the expression in inverted com-
mas, since this memory seems quite different from that of humans. For example, 
while a man can be considered responsible for forgetting, a computer cannot. There 
is obviously an intentional element in human remembering, which does not allow us 
to consider it a mechanical process. Can a refined form of statistical calculation per-
formed by a machine be considered “responsible” for ethical acts and judgements? 
The question does not appear to be a rhetorical one: the “unbiased” decisions of 
these machines are used for probation, or to flag hate speeches in social networks for 
forensic purposes, thus substituting human moral judgement. The same intentional 
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behaviour seems to be the rationale for moral responsibility, and to express a limit to 
the possibility of identifying human beings and animals in relation to their capacity 
of expressing preferences—which are, in some cases, very broad—and taking a role 
in social life.
With the help of the notion of enunciation, let us remember that a number of non-
personal, non-human, and even non-figurative actors can embody the actantial role 
of subject. According to Benveniste, the identification between non-personal and 
non-subjective is misleading:
Here again we come up against the question of the impersonals, an old prob-
lem and a sterile debate as long as we persist in confusing ‘person’ and ‘sub-
ject.’ (…). The ‘third person’ must not, therefore, be imagined as a person 
suited to depersonalization. There is no apheresis of the person; it is exactly 
the non-person, which possesses as its sign the absence of that which specifi-
cally qualifies the ‘I’ and the ‘you.’ Because it does not imply any person, it 
can take any subject whatsoever or no subject, and this subject, expressed or 
not, is never posited as a ‘person.’ This subject only adds in apposition a preci-
sion judged necessary for the understanding of the content, not for the determi-
nation of the form. Hence volat avis does not mean ’the bird flies,’ but ’it flies 
(scil.) the bird.’ The form volat would be enough in itself and, although it is 
nonpersonal, includes the grammatical notion of subject [30: 199].
I should like to emphasize this. Phenomenology is the last humanistic philosophy 
of the 20th Century; the subsequent psychoanalytic, structuralist, post-structuralist, 
constructivist, relativist and various feminist theories challenged the notion of sub-
ject and attempted to disassemble it. Phenomenological notions of person are essen-
tialist: the person is not a sum of acts or memories; on the contrary, it is the neces-
sary condition for their unity. Furthermore, it belongs to the essence of the person 
to exist and to live solely in the execution of intentional acts [1: 390]. However, 
in Edith Stein’s reflections on empathy and society, a more relational notion is dis-
played: it takes a person to recognise a person. Thus, intersubjectivity seems the real 
premise to every phenomenological inquiry, as in the Cartesian Meditations [14]. 
Intersubjective, social relations founded on empathy provide a possible explanation 
to the issue we presented at the beginning of the present paper: how can law-mak-
ing processes arise from a collective experience of injustice? To make this possible, 
the content of the individual experience of injustice must be shareable even if it is 
not directly experienced. This way it is the foundation of the formation of a collec-
tive social actor. From a semiotic point of view, we can substitute “shareable” with 
“meaningful”, identifying in the contagion the mechanism of the communication 
channel. In fact, the phenomenological analysis of social unities, presented above, 
shows an affinity to the semiotic analysis of the interaction proposed by Eric Land-
owski on contagion [31: 115]. According to Conrado Moreira Mendes,
Contagion operates without the mediation of value-objects; it is not the logic 
of junction anymore, but that of union, which governs contagion. It still does 
not operate on the cognitive plane, but on the sensible plane. Landowski refers 
to interaction by contagion, taking laughter as an example: a subject that is 
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infected by the laughter of the other without any transfer of object-value [32: 
141].
The absence of value-objects can be puzzling: according to Scheler, moral values 
are invested in actions. But these cannot be interpreted as value-objects since they 
are not exchange-objects. However, “absence of objects” does not necessarily mean 
“immediacy”: Landowski recognises a form of contagion mediated by vectors—for 
example, music [31: 185].
On the contrary, the instrumental relationships described by Edith Stein could be 
considered a case of programmed relations [33]. According to Paolo Demuru,
In programming, subjects regularly follow the narrative paths ruled by princi-
ples of physical causality and/or social coercion. This is the realm of routine 
and habits in which, as Greimas had already pointed out in De l’Imperfection 
[34], there lies a tendency to the insignificance and exploitation of meaning 
[35: 87].
The dialectic between community and society or between universalization and 
exclusion [36: 29–44] can be seen, in socio-semiotic terms, as the opposition 
between adjustment and programming, meaningfulness and insignificance, between 
make happen and make feel [35: 88] and it explains why it is not possible to speak 
about a progressive, cosmopolitan and universalising evolution of law toward inclu-
sive citizenships. Dershowitz’s perspective comes up against an insuperable bound-
ary: one of the typical manifestations of human nature is the negation of its own 
generality [37: chapter 2]. Since it is based on the intersubjective mutual recognition 
of belonging to a community, personhood can be extended beyond the limits of the 
human (as in the case of legal and “electronic” persons); however, at the same time, 
some “human entities” must be excluded from the category.
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